Lucene search

K
securityvulnsSecurityvulnsSECURITYVULNS:DOC:21318
HistoryFeb 07, 2009 - 12:00 a.m.

[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 02.06.09: HP Network Node Manager ovlaunch CGI BSS Overflow Vulnerability

2009-02-0700:00:00
vulners.com
18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

iDefense Security Advisory 02.06.09
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Feb 06, 2009

I. BACKGROUND

HP Network Node Manager (NNM) is an application suite that is used to
map out and manage network topography. NNM runs on a variety of
platforms, including Linux and multiple versions of Windows. For more
information, see the vendor's site found at the following link.

http://www.openview.hp.com/products/nnm/index.html

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a BSS based buffer overflow vulnerability in
Hewlett-Packard Development Co. LP (HP)'s Network Node Manager could
allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
affected service.

The vulnerability exists within the 'ovlaunch' CGI application, which is
used to launch the remote user interface. By sending a specially crafted
request, it is possible to trigger a buffer overflow. The vulnerability
results from an unchecked function call. The buffer that is overflowed
makes it possible to overwrite various pointers that are located after
the buffer in memory.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the affected service. IIS runs CGI
applications with reduced privileges, so a full system compromise is
not possible using only this vulnerability.

In iDefense Labs testing, it was possible to overwrite various pointers
stored after the overflowed buffer. Given this, code execution is
likely to be possible.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Network
Node Manager version 7.53 for Windows. Previous versions may also be
affected.

The Linux version of 'ovlaunch' contains the vulnerable code, but it is
not triggered. The actual hostname is used instead of the attacker
supplied 'Host' parameter.

V. WORKAROUND

Requiring authentication by modifying the session.conf file is not a
valid workaround for this vulnerability. The vulnerability occurs
during the parsing of requests, before any authentication checks.

However, it is possible to use the IIS configuration manager to require
authentication in order to execute the ovlaunch CGI. Additionally, the
IIS configuration manager can be used to limit connections by IP
address.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Hewlett-Packard Development Co. LP (HP) has released a patch which
addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at
the following URL.

http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bizsupport/TechSupport/Document.jsp?objectID=c01661610

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-4562 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

06/19/2008 Initial Contact
06/19/2008 Vendor Case # SSRT080092 set
07/10/2008 PoC sent
01/22/2009 Vendor says patch is ready
02/05/2009 Requested CVE
02/05/2009 Requested date coordination
02/06/2009 Coordinated Public Disclosure

IX. CREDIT

The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail [email protected] for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQFJjKlkbjs6HoxIfBkRAvHqAKDp4srtr0q+CZGGHhWJqmqKy1nW4QCg7++E
u046RSbr7d7Y2LhOd24nkO4=
=oXQE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/